Roles v. Armfield Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38732 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-27-2011
Roles v. Armfield Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38732
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Roles v. Armfield Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38732" (2011). Not Reported. 288.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/288
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




Disciplinary Report Officer, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38732-2011 
Ada County Docket ".'Jo. 2010-17773 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEALED FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE HONORABLE THOMAS F. NEVILLE, PRESIDING 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
James R. Stoll 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorneys for Respondent A:felodee Armfield 
Raymond A. Roles 
J.C.C., Unit El-205B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Pro Se 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A. Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
B. Statement of the Facts and Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
III. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
A. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
B. The District Court Correctly Found That Roles Did Not 
Raise a Due Process Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
C. Even if Roles Would Have Properly Plead a Due Process Claim, 
His Claim Would Have Failed Because no Liberty Interest 
was Established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
D. The District Court Correctly Found That Roles Failed to Show 
That He was a Member of a Protected Class in Support of His 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
E. Inmates do not Have a Right to be Present at Summary Judgment 
Hearing Inmate-Initiated Civil Actions, and Judge Neville did not 
Abuse His Discretion in Denying Roles' Motion to Disqualify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
A&J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,684 (2005) ............................. 5 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, at 402, 973 P.2d 749 at 754 (Ct.App. 1999) ............ 8 
Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (1988) ......................................... 6 
Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 529, 835 P.2d 1331, 1340 (Ct.App. 1992) ................... 23 
Bob Daniels and Son v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,541 (1984) ............................ 6 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91, S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) ........... 20 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) ................ 20 
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) ............................. 20 
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902 (1997) ........................................ 6 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
473 U.S. 432,440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) ............................ 16 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) ....... 7 
Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 41 785 P.2d 163, 166 (1989) ............................. 11 
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509 at 512, 181 P.3d 435 at 438 (Idaho, 2007) ........... 23 
Cutler v. Guyer, 2010 WL 3735689 *8 (D.Idaho 2010) ............................ 12, 13 
Demoran v. F.A. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................. 22 
Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007) ........................................ 6 
Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9 th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ..................... 16 
Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) ............. 16 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-70, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ......... 10 
ii 
Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 644 P.2d 255, 357 (1982) .......................... 23 
In re Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 47 at 50, 936 P.2d 690 at 693(Ct.App. 1997) .............. 20, 21 
In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 209 (N.D. 1979) ...................................... 21 
Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) ............. 15, 17 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 E.Ed.2d 718 (1969) ................... 20 
Lighter v. Hardison, 149 Idaho 712, 239 P.3d 817 (Ct.App. 2010) ....................... 8 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424, U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ............. 20 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) .................. 11 
Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Def, 34 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) ........... 15, 16 
Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434,436 (2008) .................................... 5 
Meyerv. Reno, 911 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1996) ................................... 11 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471,481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 (1972) .................. 8, 20 
Nelson v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619, 67 P.3d 98 (Ct.App. 2003) ........................... 9 
Overton v. Bazzetta, 
539 U.S. 126, 131, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2167, 156 L.Ed.2d 162, 169-70 (2003) ................ 8 
Phillip v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................. 16 
Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970) ................................ 22 
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 1275, 1277 (Ct.App. 2007) .............. 7 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995) .................... 7-11 
Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d 603, 605 (1996) .................... 7, 9-11 
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 348-49, 647 P.2d 796, 804-05 (Ct.App. 1982) ............ 10 
State ex rel Christie v. Husz, 217 Wis.2d 593, 579 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis.Ct.App.1998) ..... 21 
State v. Hanslovan, 116 Idaho 266, 775 P.2d 158 (Ct.App. 1989) ....................... 10 
111 
State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P'Ship, 127 Idaho 267,270 (1955) ............................. 6 
State v. Valentine, 190 Ariz. 107, 945 P.2d 828 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1997) ................ 21, 23 
Superintendent v. Hill, 4 72 U.S. 445 (1985) ..................................... 11, 12 
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568,573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990) .......................... 20 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) .......................... 16 
Woljfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) ............. 20 
Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175,176 (1974) ......................................... 6 
RULES 
Rule 40, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ........................................... 23 
Rule 55, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ............................................ 5 
Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ........................................ 6, 14 
iv 
Respondent Melodee Armfield, by and through her attorneys of record, submit this 
Respondent's Brief in response to Appellant Raymond Roles' Brief on appeal in this matter. 
I. 
STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises out of the denial of an inmate's internal appeal of a Disciplinary 
Offense Report. It is undisputed that the Appellant, Raymond Roles ("Roles") filed his Prisoner 
Civil Rights Complaint (CR 000004-000020), alleging that his disciplinary conviction was a 
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection (See, 000008). Roles argued that 
his rights were violated when the Disciplinary Hearing Officer, Respondent, Melodee Armfield 
("Armfield") failed to dismiss his Disciplinary Offense Report for Aggravated Assault based upon 
his defense of self-defense, which he argued that he was entitled to under Idaho statute. 
The district court correctly granted Armfield's motion for summary judgment (CR 
000030-000031), holding that despite Armfield's extensive briefing on the subject, Roles failed to 
raise a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Instead, the district court found that Roles had 
only raised a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, however, the district court dismissed 
this claim, finding that Roles failed to support that claim by showing that he was a member of a 
protected class. 
Further, Roles has appealed the district court's granting of summary judgment because 
he was denied an opportunity to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, Roles argued that the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure required the Judge to issue a transport order allowing him to be physically 
present to argue Respondent's summary judgment motion. The district court heard Roles' objection, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1. 
and denied Roles' motion on the basis that a prisoner who initiates a civil suit has no absolute right 
to be transferred from the prison to appear personally at the courthouse to argue against summary 
judgment, and that security and cost concerns weighed against it. Roles then made an oral motion 
for disqualification, which was denied after a lengthy explanation by the court. The hearing 
proceeded with Roles appearing by way of telephone. The transcript of the hearing reflects that 
Roles was allowed to present an extensive argument by way of pre-hearing briefing, and testimony 
at the hearing by way of telephone, and at no time did he complain on the record that he could not 
hear the judge or Respondent's counsel. 
B. Statement of the Facts and Procedural Background. 
On May 4, 2010, a Disciplinary Offense Report was filed, charging Roles with 
Aggravated Battery: 
On 4/20/10 at 1610 hours Inmate Roles, Raymond, 14482 was involved 
in a physical altercation in V pod in the area of cell 03. Inmate Roles was 
approached by another inmate in cell 03 and the two began to argue. 
Inmate Roles stuck the other inmate in the left side of his jaw with a 
pencil which broke during the incident. Inmate Roles began to argue with 
the other inmate and the two then began to exchange punches with closed 
fists and wrestled on the floor of the pod. 
(CR 000018) A Disciplinary Hearing was held on May 5, 2010, at which Armfield, acting as the 
Hearing Officer, confirmed the offense and sanctioned the Roles to seventeen (17) days of detention 
time. (Id.) 
Roles appealed internally on the theory that, 
I have a right under Idaho Code to self defense, to protect my self against 
any perceived attack. I have a right to do that which I deem necessary to 
end that attack/assault. Hearing officer's opinion that pencil was excessive 
is wrong. 
(CR. 000017) Armfield responded as follows: 
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Other inmate in the situation did not have a weapon. You attacked with 
a weapon & attacked in such a manner that your intent was to cause great 
bodily injury up to & including death based upon the area of the other 
inmates body that you struck with the weapon. Decision stands. 
(CR. 000017) Warden Wengler reviewed and affirmed Armfield's decision. (Id.) 
Roles claimed, and Armfield did not contest, that as a result of the disciplinary action, 
his custody level was raised and he was moved to close custody for five years. (CR 000020) 
On August 30, 2010, Roles filed his Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint, alleging that his 
disciplinary conviction was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. (CR 
000004-000020) Specifically, he claimed: 
Defendant did violated (sic) my 14th Amend. Right to equal protection 
of the law. Plaintiff has the right to protect himself against unlawful 
assault and attack pursuant (sic) Idaho Code 16-3-22(a), 16-3-23. I have 
the right to use such force as is necessary to stop any unlawful assault and 
attack. No state agency can have rule, regulation or policy which is in 
conflict with this (sic) code sections 19-13-1 and 19-15-1. My right is 
protected under United States Constitution and the Constitution of the 
State of Idaho, and the laws of Idaho. 16-3-22 -16-3-23(1). 
(CR 000004) 
On March 4, 2011, a summary judgment hearing was held. (CR, 000002; RT pg. 9, 
lines 24-25, and pg. 10, lines 7.) Appellee's Counsel appeared in person, and Appellant appeared 
telephonically, as a result of the Court's denial of his Objection to Defendant's Notice of Hearing and 
Request for Transport Order. (RT, pg. 10, lines 19-25, and pg. 11, line 1.) 
During oral argument, Roles objected to the Disciplinary Audio Tape of his disciplinary 
hearing that was attached to Appellee's attorney's affidavit, stating: 
Through the writing, I've raised issues both of - the credibility issue, 
whether or not I was raised - allowed to argue Idaho law in my - in my 
disciplinary hearing, which I was not, which they claim I was. Also, I've 
raised the possibility, since I've not heard this audio tape that these - that 
the - that the defendant has raised, whether or not it's a - a proper 
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recording or not because I have not heard it. So, I've raised a credibility 
issue as well. 
(RT, pg. 23, lines 1-9). The district court agreed with Roles' objection, stating," ... the Court will 
sustain the Plaintiffs objection as it relates to the contents of the recording and the contents of the 
recording will not be considered by this Court for purposes of summary judgment." (CR 000081) 
Additionally, the Court held that: 
Defendant has argued extensive! y that the requirements of due process are 
satisfied if "some evidence" supports the prison disciplinary action. 
However, a review of Plaintiffs Prisoner Civil Rights Complaints shows 
that the Plaintiff has not made a due process claim. Rather, the sole claim 
made by the Plaintiff is that Defendant "violated my 14th Amend. Right 
to equal protection of the law" and the Court only need address that 
claim. 
(CR 000081) The Court then denied Roles' equal protection claim, holding: 
(CR 000082) 
Plaintiff Roles has not argued that he is a member of a protected class or 
of any class at all. Rather, the Plaintiffs arguments focus on the fact that 
the Defendant did not accept the Plaintiffs (with the Plaintiff situated as 
an individual and not as a member of a group) defense of self-defense, 
and whether the Plaintiff as an individual intended great bodily harm ... 
. Plaintiff Roles does not mention any class, suspect or not, in any of his 
filings or arguments made in this case. Therefore, this Court need not 
consider self-defense as a defense in a prisoner disciplinary setting as it 
applies to a prisoner as a class. 
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as non-
moving party, the Plaintiff cannot prevail in his equal protection claim 
because he has not alleged a deliberate plan of discrimination based on 
some unjustifiable classification. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
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II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court correctly find that Roles failed to raise a due process 
claim? 
2. Even if Roles would have properly pled a due process claim, his claim would 
have failed because no liberty interest was established. 
3. Did the District Court correctly find that Roles failed to plead a Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claim? 
4. Did the District Court correctly find that Roles does not have an absolute due 
process right to appear in person at summary judgment hearing? 




A. Standard of Review. 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review utilized by 
this Court is the same standard used by the district court in initially ruling on the Motion. 
Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436 (2008). Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), 
summary judgment is to be rendered to the moving party if "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In considering 
summary judgment the Court liberally construes all facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the non-moving party. A&J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684 (2005). 
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In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party may not rest 
on allegations in the pleadings, but must produce evidence by affidavit or deposition to contradict 
the assertions of the moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 176 (1974). A 
non-moving party may not rely on general or conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, 
particularly where opposing affidavits set forth specific and otherwise uncontroverted facts. 
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902 (1997). Rather, a party must provide factual details of 
specificity equal to those furnished by his opponent. Bob Daniels and Son v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 
541 (1984). "A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact for the purpose of summary judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 143 
Idaho 894, 897 (2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, even disputed facts will not defeat summary 
judgment when the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element of his 
or her case, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (1988), or when a plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case on which he or she bears the burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P 'Ship, 127 Idaho 
267, 270 (1955). 
B. The District Court Correctly Found That Roles did not Raise a Due 
Process Claim. 
The district court found that "a review of Plaintiffs Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint 
shows that the Plaintiff has not made a due process claim. Rather, the sole claim made by the 
Plaintiff is that Defendant "violated my 14th Amend. Right to equal protection of the law" and that 
the Court need only address that claim." (See, CR 000081) The district court correctly recognized 
that Roles only specified the following equal protection claim in his Complaint: 
Defendant did violated (sic) my 14th Amend. Right to equal protection 
of the law. Plaintiff has the right to protect himself against unlawful 
assault and attack pursuant (sic) Idaho Code 16-3-22(a), 16-3-23. I have 
the right to use such force as is necessary to stop any unlawful assault and 
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attack. No state agency can have rule, regulation or policy which is in 
conflict with this (sic) code sections 19-13-1 and 19-15-1. My right is 
protected under United States Constitution and the Constitution of the 
State ofldaho, and the laws ofldaho. 16-3-22 -16-3-23(1). 
(CR 000004) The record reflects that Roles argued only that his Fourteenth Amendment right of 
equal protection was violated when the Disciplinary Hearing Officer did not dismiss his Disciplinary 
Offense Report pursuant to Idaho statutes recognizing self-defense as a defense available to free 
individuals charged of criminal aggravated assault. 
C. Even if Roles Would Have Properly Plead a Due Process Claim, His 
Claim Would Have Failed Because No Liberty Interest was Established. 
In the event that the Court finds that Roles did in fact allege that his due process rights 
were violated, Roles's claim would have failed for lack of a liberty interest. 
The due process guarantees derived from the United States Constitution and the Idaho 
Constitution are substantially the same (Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 1275, 
1277 (Ct. App. 2007), mandating that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." U.S. Const. 14th Am.; Idaho Constitution. Art. I, § 13. In order to 
determine whether an individual's due process rights have been violated, the Court must engage in 
a two-step analysis: first, it must decide whether the individual's deprived interest is a liberty or 
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d 
603, 605 (1996). This requires a finding of actual, substantive deprivation of a right. Often in this 
analysis the first step is mistakenly assumed and/or skipped completely, with the liberty interest 
mistakenly defined as the lack of procedures provided prior to the deprivation. See, Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 
472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995). Only after the court finds an actual liberty or property 
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interest deprivation exists will the court reach the next step, in which it determines the extent of due 
process procedural protections which should have been afforded. Id. 
Due process, particularly "procedural due process," is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 
92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484,494 (1972); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, at 402, 973 
P.2d 749 at 754 (Ct.App. 1999). Whether an individual has a liberty interest largely depends on the 
status of the individual. For example, if the individual is incarcerated, his/her liberties and those 
corresponding protections have been severely limited as a result of the prior criminal proceedings. 
Lighter v. Hardison, 149 Idaho 712, 239 P.3d 817 (Ct.App. 2010); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 
126,131, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2167, 156 L.Ed.2d 162, 169-70 (2003). While it has been recognized that 
"prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate," lawful incarceration necessitates 
withdrawal or limitation of may privileges and rights; "a retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995) 
(internal quotations omitted). Indeed, "[t]he very object of imprisonment is confinement[;]" thus 
"[m]any of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the 
prisoner." Lightner, supra. Often it is the case that discipline by prison officials "falls within the 
expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by the court of law" without violating any liberty or 
property interests. Id. 
Accordingly, when analyzing due process and a liberty interest in the context of the 
punishment of incarcerated prisoners, the question often becomes whether the discipline represents 
"the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty 
interest." Sandin, supra. At issue in Sandin was an inmate's assertion that he had been deprived of 
procedural due process because he was not allowed to call witnesses in a prison discipline hearing. 
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Id. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the petitioner was claiming that the lack of procedural due 
process was a deprivation of liberty, which the court found an erroneous, underlying assumption. 
Sandin rejected the proposition that any state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches upon a 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 484. Instead, it held that punishment of a 
prisoner neither imposes retribution in lieu of a valid conviction nor maintains physical control over 
otherwise free citizens, but rather "effectuates prison management and prison rehabilitative goals," 
and "falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Id. at 485. 
Sandin additionally holds that, for prisoners, any liberty interest that is protected by the 
Due Process Clause is generally limited to an interest in freedom from restraint which "imposes 
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 
Id., at 484. The Sandin Court was clear to stress that suits questioning proper procedures for internal 
discipline matters increased judicial interference in day-to-day prison operation and rarely involved 
traditional due process concerns. Id. at 483-484. In other words, it was the ultimate deprivation 
(which was disciplinary segregation in this case and in Sandin) which courts are to focus on, not the 
procedures or lack of procedures used. Only after the disciplinary action is found to be an atypical 
and significant hardship, as opposed to the "ordinary incidents of prison life," does the court satisfy 
the first prong of the inquiry, and find a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 472, 2295. In Sandin, the 
inmate had not shown the initial deprivation of a liberty interest that was entitled to protection 
through adequate procedural safeguards in the disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 485-86, 2301; Nelson 
v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619, 67 P.3d 98 (Ct.App. 2003). 
In Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 930 P.2d 603 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized and adopted the holding in Sandin. In that case, a prisoner alleged that his due process 
rights were violated at a disciplinary hearing for a charge of possession because he was denied a staff 
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representative for the hearing and the evidence (the drugs) was not brought to the hearing. Id. The 
Idaho Supreme Court specifically recognized and applied the "atypical and significant hardship" 
standard used in Sandin, and held it applicable to Art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Scheve rs, 
930 P.2d at 607. Applying this standard, the Schevers court concluded the petitioner did not have 
a liberty interest under the Idaho Constitution's Due Process Clause. Id. 
However, this conclusion was not ground-breaking Idaho legal precedent. In multiple 
previous cases Idaho had recognized that an inmate has no liberty interest or right to counsel in penal 
committee hearings. See Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 348-49, 64 7 P.2d 796, 804-05 (Ct. App. 
1982); State v. Hanslovan, 116 Idaho 266, 775 P.2d 158 (Ct.App. 1989). Thus, under Sandin, 
Schevers, Schmidt, Hanslovan, and other cases, a prisoner cannot state a due process claim arising 
out of a disciplinary proceeding unless he suffers an" atypical and significant hardship ... in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; Schevers, 930 P.2d at 607. 
In Sandin, thirty (30 days in disciplinary segregation did not rise to the level of such 
a hardship; in Schevers, fifty-five (55) days in disciplinary segregation did not. In this case, Roles 
has submitted a copy of his Disciplinary Offense Report which shows that he was sentenced to 
seventeen days of segregation (See, CR 000018), as well as a copy of his Idaho Department of 
Correction Reclassification Score Sheet which shows that following his conviction, his custody level 
was raised to close-custody for five years. (See, CR 000020) By comparison to the above case 
examples, Roles' punishments are insufficient to be recognized as "atypical and significant," and thus 
fail to rise to the level of a deprivation underlying a due process claim. Further, an increase in an 
inmate's security classification does not impose an atypical hardship in relation to ordinary prison 
life. It is well-established that the Due Process Clause itself does not afford a prisoner a liberty 
interest in his or her security classification. Hewittv. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-
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70, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Meyer v. Reno, 911 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1996); see also, Meachum 
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (no liberty interest in particular prison 
assignment) Indeed, as a matter of course, inmates receive regular classification reviews. 
Adjustments (both upward and downward) to one's security classification are routine and predictable 
events in the life of an incarcerated felon. Thus, Roles' reclassification to close custody following 
the Disciplinary Offense Report does not present "the type of atypical, significant deprivation in 
which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, at 2301. Therefore, this court 
must conclude that Roles did not have any liberty interest that would entitle him to due process 
protection. 
Additionally, only "some evidence" is required to support a Disciplinary Offense 
Report. The U.S. Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 ( 1985), held that a prison 
disciplinary action must be affirmed if there is "some evidence" to support the result. Hill, 472 U.S. 
at 455. This "some evidence" standard was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cootz v. State, 
117 Idaho 38, 40, 785 P.2d 163, 165 (1989), as referenced in Schevers: " ... We are persuaded the 
"some evidence rule" formulated by the Supreme Court in Hill is the appropriate one for use to 
adopt in prison disciplinary cases." Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 41, 785 P.2d 163, 166 (1989). 
When considering the relevance of the "some evidence" rule to this case, it is important to remember 
that Hill and Cootz were decided before Sandin at a time when case law had developed which 
entitled prisoners to certain procedural due process in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The 
"some evidence" standard was part of this development. However, it only applies if a 
constitutionally protected interest is at issue to begin with. 
In establishing the "some evidence" standard, the Supreme Court stated: 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11. 
... This standard is met if "there was some evidence from which the 
conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced ... " United 
States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of /migration, 273 U.S. at 106, 
47 S.Ct. At 304. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not 
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the 
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid, 
United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-134, 44 S.Ct. 260, 
260-261, 68 L.Ed.2d 590 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018 
(CA8 1974). We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard 
as a constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take 
place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must 
often act swiftly on the basis of the evidence that might be insufficient in 
less exigent circumstances. See, Wo(ff, 418 U.S. at 562-563, 567-569, 94 
S.Ct. at 2977-2978, 2980-2981. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of 
prison administrators that have some basis in fact. 
Superintendent v. Hill, 4 72 U.S. at 456. This standard does not require that prison staff necessarily 
be right. It requires only some evidence to support the sanction. Here, Roles was afforded a hearing. 
By the Roles' own admission, he admits to fighting with another inmate, and hitting that inmate with 
a pencil, although Roles characterizes the fighting as self-defense. (See CR 000006) "A DOR 
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding with a beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. The 
finer point of whether a battery charge would be defeated by the defense of self defense in a criminal 
action is not relevant in a DOR setting, given that some evidence of guilt was presented at the DOR 
hearing." Cutler v. Guyer, 2010 WL 3735689 *8 CD.Idaho 2010) While Roles has reasons 
supporting all of his actions, they are not necessarily valid reasons when considering the overall 
security concerns of the institution. In any event, the DOR hearing officer and reviewing authority 
clearly had "some" evidence upon which to base their decision. It cannot be said that their decision 
was "without a shred of evidence" or arbitrary or capricious, that is, having no substantial relation 
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to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Cutler v. Guyer, 2010 WL 3735689 *9 (D.Idaho 
2010) 
Roles' admissions are enough to support an aggravated battery charge under the "some" 
evidence standard as applied to the applicable IDOC definition of the offense of Aggravated Battery 
at the time of the disciplinary hearing. However, Roles has raised the issue of whether Armfield's 
counsel submitted accurate records to the district court, which were wrongly relied upon in the 
district court's granting of summary judgment. Specifically, Roles contends that the ICC policy 
submitted together with the Affidavit of James Stoll which defined the inmate offense of Aggravated 
Battery was outdated. 
The Affidavit of James Stoll was submitted to the district court in support of the 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (CR 000032-000059) Attached to the Affidavit was 
ICC Policy 15-100, which indicated that "[i]t is the policy of the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) 
to follow the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) Directive 318.02.01.001, Disciplinary 
Procedures ... " (CR 000037) The effective date of this policy was June 27, 2005. (ld.) Included 
with this policy was a document entitled, Category of Offenses, identifies on its face that it is an 
attachment to Directive 318, last revised on September 24, 2003. (Id.) This document defined the 
inmate offense of Aggravated Battery as follows: 
Aggravated Battery. 
Example: Battery causes great bodily harm; or permanent disability; or 
permanent disfigurement; or uses a deadly weapon or instrument; or uses 
any vitriol, corrosive acid, or a caustic chemical of any nature; or uses any 
poison or other noxious or destructive substance or liquid; or upon the 
person of a pregnant female causes great bodily harm, permanent 
disability, or permanent disfigurement to an embryo or fetus. 
(See CR00050) The district court quoted the above definition in its factual background section of 
the Memorandum Decision and Order. (See CR 000079) 
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In support of Roles' objection to the inclusion of the above definition, Roles points out 
that he attached a competing document defining Aggravated Assault to his Answer and Objection 
to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. (See CR 000076). This section defines the offense 
of Aggravated Battery as follows: 
Wilful and unlawful use of physical force, chemical, poison, weapon or 
other destructive substance upon another person that intentionally causes 
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement, or 
upon a pregnant woman causing great bodily harm, permanent disability 
or permanent disfigurement to an embryo or fetus. 
(See CR000076) However, on it's face, the document submitted by Roles fails to rebut the policy 
submitted with the Affidavit of James R. Stoll. Rule 56( e ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states 
in pertinent part, 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
the party. 
Here, Roles' competing document was submitted as an attachment to Roles' briefing, and not by 
affidavit, and therefore, lacks foundation. Additionally, the document submitted by Roles does not 
show any indication that it supercedes the policy document attached to the Affidavit of James R. 
Stoll. 
Further, in support of his argument, Roles' has attached a copy of the most recent 
revision of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) Directive 318.02.01.001, Disciplinary 
Offense Codes, as Appendix A to his Appellant Brief. Armfield objects to the inclusion of this 
document on the basis that it is not part of the Clerk's Record. However, even if the Court allows 
this document, it only proves that the policy definition attached to the Affidavit of James R. Stoll 
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is correct. Roles has been nice enough to circle at the bottom of the page of this new exhibit 
information clarifying that these definitions were last updated on March 15, 2010 (ten days after 
Roles' disciplinary hearing). Therefore, there is no question of fact as to whether the definition of 
Aggravated Assault as submitted by the Respondent via the Affidavit of James R. Stoll, and later 
cited by the district court was the applicable definition at the time of Roles's disciplinary hearing. 
Because Roles has not suffered an actual, substantive deprivation of liberty, the district 
court did not need to address all of Roles' underlying claims, including the issue regarding whether 
Roles was given the opportunity to fully articulate his self-defense argument at the disciplinary 
hearing. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Prior to 
reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for 
decision.") (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985)). 
D. The District Court Correctly Found That Roles Failed to Show That He 
was a Member of a Protected Class in Support of His Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Claim. 
The district court denied Roles' Equal Protection claim, holding: 
Plaintiff Roles has not argued that he is a member of a protected class or 
of any class at all. Rather, the Plaintiffs arguments focus on the fact that 
the Defendant did not accept the Plaintiffs (with the Plaintiff situated as 
an individual and not as a member of a group) defense of self-defense, 
and whether the Plaintiff as an individual intended great bodily harm ... 
. Plaintiff Roles does not mention any class, suspect or not, in any of his 
filings or arguments made in this case. Therefore, this Court need not 
consider self-defense as a defense in a prisoner disciplinary setting as it 
applies to a prisoner as a class. 
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as non-
moving party, the Plaintiff cannot prevail in his equal protection claim 
because he has not alleged a deliberate plan of discrimination based on 
some unjustifiable classification. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. (CR 000082) 
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"[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure 
every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether 
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted 
agents." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 
(2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Equal protection claims alleging disparate treatment or classification are subject to a 
heightened standard of scrutiny when they involve a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, such as race 
or national origin, or when they involve a burden on the exercise of fundamental personal rights 
protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Otherwise, equal protection claims are subject to a 
rational basis inquiry. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 
(1993). 
Roles' argument appears to be that Idaho statutes create a protected "prisoner" class for 
equal protection purposes, and that prisons must give prisoners the benefit of the criminal self-
defense statute when determining prison administrative discipline. However, there is no legal 
support for Roles' arguments. Because it is well established that prisoners do not constitute a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class, Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); 
Phillip v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9 th Cir. 1997), the district court correctly recognized that 
Roles' made no assertion in his Complaint or his briefing that he was treated any differently than any 
other prisoner by Armfield. Because the record is devoid of any facts showing a deprivation of 
Roles' equal protection rights, there was no need for the district court to reach the constitutional 
issue, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment. See Meinhold v. United States 
Dep't of Def, 34 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9 th Cir. 1994) ("Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, 
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federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for decision.") ( quoting Jean v. Nelson, 4 72 
U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985)). 
E. Inmates Who Initiate Civil Actions Do Not Have an Absolute Due 
Process Right to be Present at Summary Judgment Hearings, and Judge 
Neville did not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Roles' Motion to 
Disqualify. 
Roles has asserted that the Judge's decision to deny his request to be present in the 
courtroom for the summary judgment hearing violated his due process rights. He has also asserted 
that the judge's deviation from the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure was grounds for disqualification. 
On March 4, 2011 a hearing on Armfield's Motion for Summary Judgment was held 
before Judge Neville. (CR, 000002; RT pg. 9, lines 24-25, and pg. 10, lines 7.) At beginning of 
the hearing, Judge Neville stated: 
... I have seen the Objection to Defendant's Notice of Hearing and 
Request for Transfer Order, filed January 3, 2011. (RT, pg. 10, lines, 21-
23.)That has been effectively denied because the Court did not enter a 
transport order and Mr. Roles is participating telephonically. 
(RT, pg. 10, lines 24-25, and pg. 11, line 1.) 
Upon defense counsel starting his oral argument, Judge Neville stopped and said, "Mr. 
Roles, can you hear Mr. Stoll?" (RT, pg. 12, lines 2-3) Mr. Roles responded by stating: 
Yeah. I can - I can hear, Your Honor, but I'm gonna - be raising a further 
objection to this telephonic hearing pursuant to Rule 7(B)(4)(a), which 
explicitly states that we can't be holding a telephonic or - or video 
hearing in a motion for summary judgment unless both parties stipulate. 
So, I would be raising a further objection. 
(RT, pg. 12, lines 4-10) Judge Neville responded by stating, "Yeah. I'm going to overrule your 
objection, sir. You don't get a ride to town every time you file a motion. That's just the bottom line. 
So, I'll overrule the objection." (RT, pg. 12, lines 11-14.) 
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Roles responded by stating, "then I'm gonna - I'm gonna also - then I'm gonna move 
for a disqualification of the judge for - for cause - ... (RT, pg. 12, lines 18-20) pursuant to Rule 
40. That would be 40(D)(2)(a), I believe (a)(4)." (RT, pg. 12, lines 22-23) Roles then explained, 
"the- the thing about cause, Your Honor, is I didn't have cause until right now." (RT, pg. 13, lines 
11-13) Judge Neville responded, 
Oh, I see. So, your - your cause is the first time you lose a motion, a 
preliminary motion, that's your cause? You're going to file - your going 
to move to disqualify any judge that rules against you even (RT, pg. 13, 
lines 18) ... on a ... (RT, pg. 13, line 20) .... 
Roles then interrupted Judge Neville: 
No. But in this particular case, Your Honor, the - the - the - the 
Supreme Court makes our - makes our rules, if I'm - if I'm correct in 
saying that, So, the - so, the Idaho Supreme Court has said that a motion 
for summary judgment is not proper in ... (RT, pg. 13, lines 21-25) this 
unless both - unless both parties stipulate. I'm only attempting to follow 
the rules and - and go by the law. 
(RT, pg. 14, lines 1-3). Judge Neville then allowed Roles to argue his motion. (RT, pg. 14, lines 
6-8). Roles argued the following: 
Well, Your Honor, as I've stipulated, Rule 7 says that - that this can't 
happen. So, I have to say for cause because you're prejudiced against me 
and - and biased for the - for the defendant in this case. There - there 
can't be any other reason. I mean, a law is a law, the rule is the rule. If 
we're - if we're gonna hold a legal hearing, then - then it has to be legal 
pursuant to Idaho law and pursuant to Idaho Rules pertaining to motion 
for summary judgment. 
(RT, pg. 14, lines 9-18) In denying Roles' motion, Judge Neville stated the following: 
The Court's had the opportunity to review a Civil Rule, I presume, which 
would apply to the - a civil case such as this, Rule 7(B)(4), as I 
understood the defendant [verbatim] to say. I thought he said 7(B)( 4)(A); 
I don't see a part A to that. But in (RT, pg. 15, lines 21-25) any event it 
talks about hearings that may be held by telephone or video conferencing. 
(RT, pg. 16, lines 1-2.) 
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Frankly, the- the Court is aware I I don't know Mr. Roles personally, 
I don't think I've ever had him in the courtroom but he's in custody for 
some very serious offenses that, as the Court recalls, may include major 
sex offenses such as rape and penetration by a foreign object, and at least 
one other matter. 
(RT, pg. 16, lines, 3-8) 
So, I think it's a it's a security situation for this Court to authorize an 
inmate to be brought from the prison into court for a civil matter, which 
he has initiated. It it is not a matter of right for an inmate who is 
serving a very long sentence, as I recall a life sentence, to be brought to 
court each and every time on a civil matter which they bring, whether or 
not the matter has any merit. 
(RT, pg. 16, lines 9-16) 
So, what I'm going to say is that as a matter of course, this Court does not 
routinely, in every case involving long long sentence, high security 
inmates, bring them to court for civil matters which they initiate. I don't 
- that isn't about being discriminating against mister or biased against 
Mr. Roles; I'm not. I don't think I've ever met Mr. Roles. I'm not aware 
of ever have having had him in my courtroom, and I was not the judge 
that handled his (RT, pg. 16, lines 17-25) case all those years ago, even 
though I've been around long enough to have done that. 
(RT, pg. 17, lines 1-2) 
So, I don't think it's a an issue of bias when the Court does not authorize 
the defendant to be brought from the institution into - into civil court and 
incur that expense, frankly, every time an inmate files a civil matter or 
initiates a civil case, which Mr. Roles has done in this case. And - and 
just because the Court has rules or did not grant his motion to be 
transported here does not mean the Court is biased against him. 
(RT, pg. 17, lines 3-11) 
Again, I don't believe I know Mr. Roles from Adam frankly, but I am 
aware of his background and why he's there because that's a a matter 
that the Court should be familiar with if I'm going to handle a case from 
an inmate. 
(RT, pg. 17, lines 12-16) 
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So, I'm going to deny the motion for disqualification for cause because 
Mr. Roles has simply not stated any cause, and this Court knows of no 
basis for granting the motion. 
(RT, pg. 17, lines 17-20) 
The essence of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424, U.S. 319,333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); 
Boddiev. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,378, 91, S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, (1971); Sweitzerv. Dean, 
118 Idaho 568,573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990). Decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish 
that the constitutional protection extends to prisoners, and affords them a limited right of access to 
the courts, to challenge their convictions or their confinement and to pursue actions for violations 
of their civil rights. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 82197 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 
483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 E.Ed.2d 718 (1969). 
This does not mean, however, that an inmate has an absolute right to be personally 
present at trial in civil litigation. Rather, " [ d]ue process is a flexible constitutional principle and calls 
for such procedural protection as the particular situation demands." In re Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 4 7 
at 50, 936 P.2d 690 at 693(Ct.App. 1997) See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893; 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 
1230 (1961), the United States Supreme Court explained: 
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible 
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation .... 
[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of 
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of 
the government function involved as well as of the private interest that 
has been affected by government action. 
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In Baby Doe, an incarcerated father applied to the magistrate court for a writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum requiring that he be transported to the disciplinary hearing in an action 
brought by the Department of Health and Welfare for termination of his parental rights. The 
magistrate denied the application and instead appointed counsel to represent the father and directed 
that the father could testify by way of a telephone deposition. The father asserted that the denial of 
his request to be personally present at the hearing was a deprivation of due process. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals concluded that the father's due process rights were not violated because he was allowed 
to present testimony by way of telephone deposition. In arriving at that conclusion, the Court 
enumerated several factors appropriate for consideration in balancing the private and governmental 
interests at stake when an inmate seeks to appear personally in court in a civil proceeding: 
[TJhe trial court may take into account the costs and inconvenience of 
transporting a prisoner from his place of incarceration to the courtroom, 
any potential danger of security risk which the presence of a particular 
inmate would pose to the court, the substantiality of the matter at issue, 
the need for an early determination of the matter, the possibility of 
delaying trial until the prisoner is released, the probability of success on 
the merits, the integrity of the correctional system, and the interests of the 
inmate presenting his testimony in person rather than by deposition. 
Baby Doe, 130 Idaho at 52,936 P.2d at 695 (quoting In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 209 (N.D. 1979) 
If, in balancing these interests, the trial court concludes that they do not weigh in the 
favor of allowing a prisoner to appear personally, the court should then consider alternative means 
by which the prisoner's right to be heard may be honored. See Baby Doe, supra. Such alternatives 
include the appearance of the inmate by telephone. State v. Valentine, 190 Ariz. 107,945 P.2d 828 
(Ariz.Ct.App. 1997); State ex rel Christie v. Husz, 217 \Vis.2d 593, 579 N.W.2d 243, 246 
(Wis.Ct.App.1998). The trial court has discretion to fashion an approach that best suits the 
particular circumstance. 
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Further, in Demoran v. F.A. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1986), an inmate appealed the 
granting of summary judgment because he was denied an opportunity to appear at the summary 
judgment hearing. At the time of the hearing, Demoran was an inmate at the county jail. The Court 
held that, "a plaintiff in a civil suit who is confined in state prison at the time of a hearing has no 
absolute right to appear personally. Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970) (Because 
Demoran had notice of the hearing and submitted a written memorandum in opposition to summary 
judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to attend.) See 
Demoran, 781 F.2d 155 at 158 (9th Cir. 1985) 
As shown by excerpts of the record above, the district judge denied Roles' motion to 
be present in the courtroom to argue his opposition to summary judgment. In denying Roles' request 
to be transferred, the court found that there was a security concern in transferring Roles, who was 
serving a life sentence for serious sex offenses including rape and penetration with a foreign object 
The court also considered the cost the prison would incur every time an inmate files a civil matter 
or initiates a civil case, which Mr. Roles has done in this case. Notwithstanding, Roles had 
submitted a brief opposing summary judgment, and he was allowed to participate at the summary 
judgment hearing by way of telephone. Therefore, Roles has failed to show that a due process 
violation occurred. 
Further, Roles has asserted that the during the summary judgment hearing, the 
telephone at the prison was cutting in and out, and he was unable to hear the entire argument at the 
hearing. He argues that when he attempted to bring this matter to the judge's attention, he was told 
by the judge that he did not have permission to speak. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 22) The record does 
not support Roles' version of events. A copy of the reporter's transcript is part of the record, and no 
where within transcript is there any indication that Roles was not able to hear due to complications 
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with the telephone reception. In fact, reading through the transcript it is quite apparent through the 
multiple exchanges between Roles and Judge Neville that Roles was able to hear, comprehend, and 
quickly reply to all statements made to him by the court. The transcript is devoid of any request by 
Roles for the judge or Respondent's counsel to repeat anything said due to the alleged telephone 
reception cutting in and out. "A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and 
later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal. Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 644 
P.2d 255,357 (1982). In addition, "[s]ubstantive issues will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal." Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509 at 512, 181 P.3d 435 at 438 (Idaho, 2007). The 
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on 
appeal." Id. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure40(d)(2)(A)( 4) provides that a judge maybe disqualified 
from presiding in any action where "the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any 
party or the case in the action." A judge's determination that disqualification is not necessary will 
be disturbed on appeal only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520,529, 
835 P.2d 1331, 1340 (Ct. App. 1992). Here, as explained in more detail above, Judge Neville 
made an exhaustive clarification on the record detailing the multiple reasons why he was denying 
Roles' request to be present for the hearing. Further, Roles was able to appear by way of telephone, 
which is a suitable alternative to preserve Roles' right to be heard. State v. Valentine, 190 Ariz. 107, 
945 P.2d 828 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1997). Further, adverse rulings, by themselves, do not demonstrate 
disqualifying bias. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 530, 835 P.2d 1331, 1341 (Ct.App.1992) 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons and well settled Idaho law, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in dismissing Roles' Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint on summary judgment. 
Accordingly, Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affirm the dismissal of Roles' Prisoner 
Civil Rights Complaint. 
DATED this 27th day of December, 2011. 
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